

## CHAPTER XVI

### WAR WITH PERSIA AND CARTHAGE

492-479 B.C.

#### I. FIRST AND SECOND EXPEDITIONS

**194. Causes of the War.** — The causes of the war may be briefly summarized. (1) The Persian kings, like the earlier Assyrian,<sup>1</sup> found conquest profitable not only from the plunder of captured cities, but more from the annual tribute imposed on the subjects. (2) It was perfectly natural, then, that after the subjugation of Ionia, the Persians should begin to think of conquering the rest of the Hellenes on the neighboring islands and on the Greek peninsula. (3) But when Ionia revolted and received aid from Athens and Eretria, Darius saw that he could not secure the lasting submission of his Asiatic subjects without conquering their meddlesome kinsmen beyond the Aegean. (4) Highly incensed at the burning of Sardis, he strove to wreak vengeance on Athens and Eretria, as he considered these two cities chiefly responsible for that act. (5) To all these motives must be added his keen appreciation of the value of Greeks as subjects. He would expect them to build and man fleets for him, just as the Ionians had been doing, and he could draw from their country architects, painters, and sculptors for the adornment of his capital cities.<sup>2</sup>

**195. The First Expedition (492 B.C.).** — The first expedition was led by Mar-do'ni-us, son-in-law of Darius. At the head of a great army he marched through Thrace. For provisions he depended chiefly upon a fleet which accompanied him along the shore. In rounding Mount Athos the ships were wrecked, and at the same time his troops were slaughtered by the natives. Mardonius expected to conquer the whole Greek peninsula, but only retook Thrace and

<sup>1</sup> § 36.

<sup>2</sup> § 188; cf. 66.

received the submission of Macedon. The failure of his enterprise brought him into disgrace at the Persian court.

Darius now made ready another expedition, meanwhile sending heralds among those Greek communities which were still free, to demand "earth and water." There was no need, Darius thought, of attacking those who would willingly submit. The Athenians, however, threw the king's herald into a pit, and the Spartans dropped the one who came to them into a well, bidding them take earth and water thence to their lord. These acts violated the international law which made the persons of heralds sacred. Those Athenians and Spartans who advised this course of conduct must have felt that the Persian king would never forgive such an outrage, and that its perpetration would commit their own states to a life-and-death struggle.

**196. Beginning of the Second Expedition (490 B.C.).** — After the failure of Mardonius, the conquest of Greece became with Darius a question of honor. But his unfortunate experience taught him that the land route was too long and difficult. It required months to make this journey, whereas a fleet could sail directly across the Aegean in a few days. This was the route which he chose accordingly for the second expedition. In the summer of 490 B.C. the fleet of six hundred ships, which had long been preparing, moved westward across the sea, receiving the submission of the islanders on the way. Da'tis, a Mede, and Ar-ta-pher'nes, a kinsman of Darius, were in command. Their object was to punish Athens and Eretria for helping the Ionian revolt, and to conquer whatever territory they could for their lord.

First the Persians besieged Eretria. After a brave defence of six days, it was betrayed by two citizens. Eretrian fugitives who brought the sad news to Athens found the city full of the spirit of resistance. Her heavy infantry was well trained in the use of arms.<sup>1</sup> It was a happy omen, too, for Athens that among her generals for the year was Miltiades, who had proved his ability as ruler of Chersonese, and was well acquainted with Persian warfare. As soon as he and the other generals heard that the enemy were moving against Attica, they gathered their entire force, and de-

<sup>1</sup> § 150.

spatched Phi-dip'pi-des, a swift, long-distance runner, to Sparta to ask help. He reached Sparta, a hundred and fifty miles distant, the day after starting. "Men of Lacedaemon," he said to the authorities, "the Athenians beseech you to hasten to their aid, and not allow that state which is the most ancient in all Greece to be enslaved by the barbarians. Eretria, look you, is already carried away captive, and Greece weakened by the loss of no mean city."<sup>1</sup> The Lacedaemonians, though they wished to help the Athenians, had to wait several days before setting out, as a law forbade them to go to war in any month before the full moon.

**197. The Battle of Marathon** (490 B.C.). — After sacking Eretria, the Persians, under the guidance of the aged Hippias,<sup>2</sup> landed at Marathon. The Athenian army, led by the polemarch and the ten generals, went to meet them. It encamped above the plain, on a height which covered the principal road to Athens. The Athenian phalanx now consisted of ten thousand men, and was reënforced by a few soldiers from Plataea, a friendly city of Boeotia. The Persians were superior in number, but we do not know how many they were.<sup>3</sup> Their great advantage, however, was that even in their contests with the Greeks they had never lost a battle. When the Athenians saw themselves outnumbered, and failed to receive the expected help from Sparta, they thought of returning home without a contest, to make a defence behind the walls of the city. In the council of war five generals voted for retreat and five for battle. It remained for the polemarch to cast the deciding vote. Thereupon Miltiades urged him to decide for battle, explaining the advantages of an immediate contest and the hopelessness of a long resistance within the city. The polemarch was convinced. It was agreed that Miltiades, the most experienced general, should have the command.

He waited till the Persians began their advance with a view to forcing their way to Athens. He knew well that their strength

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, vi. 106.

<sup>2</sup> §§ 163, 168.

<sup>3</sup> Certain writers who lived centuries after the event give various estimates, from 200,000 to 600,000. None of these figures are trustworthy. The only basis even for a rough calculation is the number of ships in the fleet, and we have no certain knowledge of their capacity. Estimates of modern writers run from 60,000 down to about 15,000.

lay in long-distance fighting with the bow, whereas that of the phalanx was in a hand-to-hand struggle. When, accordingly, the opposing armies got within bow-shot of each other, Miltiades ordered the Athenians to charge at a double-quick march, so as to avoid the shower of arrows and bring their own strength to bear as speedily as possible upon the enemy. The Persians, who had no defence against the spear-thrust, fled to their ships, and the victory was won. The great tactic principle employed was the discovery of Miltiades. The Greeks never forgot it.

This was perhaps the most important battle yet fought in the history of the world. In the wars among the great powers of the Orient, it made little difference to the world which gained the victory, they were so nearly alike in character and civilization. The same may be said of the petty strife always going on among the Greek states. But at Marathon, Europe and Asia, represented by Greece and Persia respectively, came into conflict; and the question at issue was whether Europe should be brought under the control of Asiatic government and Asiatic ideas.<sup>1</sup> In other words, the question was whether Europe was to have Greek freedom or Asiatic despotism. It was well for the future of the world, therefore, that the Greeks triumphed at Marathon. They were no braver than the Persians; but their freedom gave them spirit, and their intelligence provided



A PERSIAN ARCHER

<sup>1</sup> P. 57, III. 1.

them with superior arms, organization, and training. The victory encouraged Greece to hope for success in the greater conflict with Persia, which was soon to come, and inspired the Athenians ever afterward to brave danger in the forefront of Hellas.

## II. AN INTERVAL OF PREPARATION

**198. The Disgrace of Miltiades.** — Miltiades now stood at the summit of fame. He thought the present moment favorable for building up the Athenian power and wealth at the expense of the islanders who had sided with the king. So he planned an expedition against Paros, and asked the Athenians for ships and men, promising to make them rich, but not telling them just what he intended to do. He sailed with his fleet to Paros, and demanded a contribution of a hundred talents. As the Parians refused to pay anything, he besieged them without effect for nearly a month, and then returned wounded to Athens, to disappoint the hopes of all. His enemies found in his failure an opportunity to assail him. Xan-thip'pus, leader of the republican party,<sup>1</sup> prosecuted him for having deceived the people. The penalty would have been death; but because of Miltiades' great services to the state, it was lightened to a fine of fifty talents. He died of his wound, and the fine was paid by his son Cimon.


**199. The Government becomes more Democratic.** — The republicans gathered strength from the victory at Marathon and even from the overthrow of Miltiades. By ostracizing successively the most prominent friends of Hippias,<sup>2</sup> they utterly disorganized the tyrant's faction. Meanwhile they dealt the nobles a heavy blow by changing the mode of appointment to the nine archonships. Before 487 B.C. the archons had been elected; henceforth they were to be appointed by lot. The change degraded these old aristocratic offices by opening them to men of inferior ability. From this time the polemarch ceased to have even nominal command of the army, and the ten generals took the place of the nine archons as the chief magistrates. On this issue the citizens were divided into conservatives, who were opposed to changing the government,

<sup>1</sup> § 192.

<sup>2</sup> §§ 163, 168, 197.

and the democrats, who wished to make it more liberal. These were to be the Athenian political parties of the future.

200. **Aristeides and Themistocles; the Building of a Navy.** — Meanwhile the state had been deriving considerable income from the silver mines which it owned at *Lau-ri-um* in southeastern Attica. A dispute as to the best way of using this revenue arose between *Ar-is-tei'des* and Themistocles, the two leaders of the democratic party. Aristeides, satisfied with the army which had won the battle of *Marathon*, was evidently willing that the old custom of dividing the revenues among the citizens should continue. Themistocles, on the other hand, was determined that Athens should have a navy to protect her from the Persian attacks by sea. It had long been in his mind that Persia could not provision a force large enough to con-



A TRIREME

quer Greece unless she held command of the sea. Thence he reasoned that Athens, by using her silver for building a powerful navy, could outmatch the fleets in the Persian service, and in this way save Greece. Aristeides was ostracized.

The friends of Aristeides called him "the Just," and tried to fasten on Themistocles the opposite character, while the friends of Themistocles retorted in kind. We often meet with the same hero-worship and the same vilification in modern politics. A careful study of the facts seems to prove that these two men were much alike in moral character. In genius Themistocles was vastly superior. After putting down the opposition, he carried his plan through the assembly. The state built two hundred triremes,<sup>1</sup> which proved

<sup>1</sup> Vessels with three banks of oars. See the ancient illustration. The benches of the oarsmen were arranged in three tiers, one above the other. Each tier re-

to be the chief means of winning a great naval victory over the Persians and of making Athens the head of a maritime empire. Measured by its far-reaching effects upon Greece and the world, the creation of an Athenian navy by Themistocles was one of the grandest achievements of statesmanship known to ancient history.

### III. THE THIRD EXPEDITION

**201. Preparations for the Invasion.** — Darius was more troubled by the failure at Marathon than he had been by the destruction of Sardis, and was now more than ever bent on the conquest of Greece. Accordingly he began preparations on a grander scale than ever. When he died (485 B.C.), his son and successor Xerxes, after a little hesitation, threw his whole soul into the work. The land route, undertaken by Mardonius, was to be followed, but the army and fleet were to be so gigantic as to crush every opposition by mere weight. Provisions were stored at convenient points along the route, and the engineers of the king were busily engaged in constructing a bridge of boats across the Hellespont. Rarely in history has a campaign been so carefully prepared. In the spring of 481 B.C. the nations of his empire were pouring their armed forces into Asia Minor, and the autumn of the year found Xerxes with his host encamped for the winter at Sardis. We do not know how large his army was, but it certainly did not exceed three hundred thousand troops.<sup>1</sup> On the sea was a great fleet manned by Greeks, Phoenicians, and Egyptians. The invasion was to bring Greece into great peril; for Xerxes hoped to win by sheer force of numbers.

**202. Union of the Loyal Greeks.** — While Xerxes was in camp at Sardis, his messengers came to the Greek states demanding earth

quired an oar about a yard longer than the one below it. On the trireme were about 200 rowers. Few states at this time had triremes, but they soon became the normal "battleship." In later time, vessels with five and six banks of oars became common, and we hear of some with fifteen and sixteen banks. The latter must have been difficult to manage.

<sup>1</sup> According to Herodotus, it contained 1,700,000 infantry, besides cavalry, reinforcements added along the march, and camp-followers more numerous than fighters, making a total of more than 5,000,000. Modern estimates range from 300,000 down to 50,000. The number of ships given by Herodotus, 1207, is also believed by modern scholars to be an exaggeration. There is no doubt, however, of its superiority to that of the Greeks.

and water, and received these tokens of submission from many of them. But none came to Athens and Sparta, as they were to be punished for their treatment of the heralds sent by Darius. A council of the loyal states met on the Isthmus to plan for the defence of Greece. This union was practically an enlargement of the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta. The states represented in the council agreed under oath to wage war in common for the protection of their liberties. They also reconciled their enmities with one another, and sent envoys to the other Greek states to invite them to join the League. Most of the states found various excuses for refusing the invitation.

The plan of the allies was to build a wall across the Isthmus of Corinth and to make their main defence there. It was a narrow policy, directed by the Lacedaemonian ephors. As Xerxes approached the Hellespont in the spring of 480 B.C., the allies made a feeble attempt to defend Thessaly against him by posting an army in the Vale of Tempe. On the withdrawal of this army, the Thes-salians went over to the enemy.

**203. The Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium (480 B.C.).** — To prevent central Greece from following the example of the Thes-salians, the ephors sent King Le-on'i-das with three hundred heavy-armed Spartans and a few thousand allies to hold the pass of Ther-mop'y-lae, and thus shut Xerxes out from central Greece. They professed to believe that he could hold the pass till the Olympic games were over. Then, they said, they would take the field in full force. The fleet, comprising the squadrons of the various cities of the League, sailed to Ar-te-mis'i-um to coöperate with the army at Thermopylae. Each squadron was under its own admiral, and the whole fleet was commanded by the Spartan Eu-ry-bi'a-des.

The Persians failed to carry Leonidas' position by assault, for their numbers did not count in the narrow pass. The discipline of the Greeks, their strong defensive armor, and their long spears might have held the hordes of Xerxes in check for an indefinite time, had not the Persians gained the rear of the pass through the treachery of a Greek. Most of the allies then withdrew; but Leonidas, with his three hundred Spartans and a few allies, remained and prepared for a death struggle. The contrast between the




Greeks and the Orientals was at its height at Thermopylae: on one side, the Persian officers scourged their men to battle; on the other, the Spartans voluntarily met their death in obedience to law. "The Lacedaemonians are the best of all men when fighting in a body; for though free, yet they are not free in all things, since over them is set law as a master. They certainly do whatever that master commands; and he always bids them not flee in battle from any multitude of men, but stay at their post, and win the victory or lose their lives."<sup>1</sup> The dead were buried where they fell, and above the three hundred was placed this epitaph: "Stranger, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here in obedience to their laws."

Meanwhile a storm off the Magnesian coast had destroyed a third of the Persian navy. This enormous loss to the enemy encouraged the wavering admirals of Greece to maintain their station at Artemisium; and though they learned that the Persians had sent two hundred ships round Euboea to cut off their retreat, they were now ready for battle. After the Greeks had destroyed or captured several Persian vessels, night closed the engagement. Fortunately for the Greeks, another storm wrecked the hostile squadron in their rear, and thus enabled them to concentrate their whole fleet of over three hundred ships against the enemy. On the following day, accordingly, the two navies in full force put to sea against each other. The battle was indecisive; but the Greeks lost so heavily that their admirals had already resolved to retreat when a messenger came with news of the defeat at Thermopylae. It was now clear that the fleet could no longer maintain its position.

**204. The March of Xerxes to Athens.** — Xerxes was now moving through central Greece toward Athens. Nearly all the states west of Attica submitted and sent their troops to reënforce his army. The men of Delphi, according to their own account, hid the treasures of Apollo in a cave and prepared to resist the Persian corps which had come to pillage their temple; then some god aided them by bringing a thunderstorm and hurling great crags down Mount Parnassus upon the advancing enemy. In this way, they said, Apollo defended his holy shrine.

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, vii. 104.

The Greek fleet paused at Sal'a-mis to help the Athenians remove their families and property to places of safety. This was their last resource, as the Peloponnesians were bent on defending only Peloponnese. Indeed, the other admirals wished to hurry on to the Isthmus; but Themistocles would not go with his fleet, and the others felt they could not afford to lose it. On entering his city Themistocles found it in despair. Some time before this the Athenians had sent to consult the Delphic oracle with respect to the approaching war, and a dreadful answer had come foretelling



BAY OF SALAMIS  
(From a photograph)

utter ruin. The Athenian messengers besought a more favorable reply, saying they would remain in the shrine till their death if it were not granted. Then the god grew merciful, and promised that the "wooden wall" would save them.

205. **The Battle of Salamis** (480 B.C.). — Some thought that the "wooden wall" was the fence about the Acropolis; but Themistocles said no, it meant the ships, and thus he induced the Athenians to quit their homes and place all their hopes in the fleet. Themistocles was the soul of resistance to Persia. His resourceful mind supplied courage, unity, and religious faith. He was now determined that the battle between Asia and Europe should be fought in the bay of Salamis. First, he exhausted the resources of eloquence and argument to persuade the admirals that here was the


most favorable place for the fight; but when arguments and even threats failed, he secretly advised the enemy to block the Greeks up in the bay. This message he conveyed to Xerxes by a trusty slave, who was instructed to say that the Greeks were disunited and ready to flee, and that Themistocles, wishing well to the king, advised him to cut off their retreat. By following his advice Xerxes compelled the Greeks to fight. The three hundred and seventy-eight Greek triremes, nearly half of which were manned by Athenians, had to face a much greater fleet. But in the narrow strait superiority in number was a disadvantage, — closely crowded together, the enemy's ships were unable to manoeuvre, and even wrecked one another by collision. Among the Athenian warriors was the poet Aes'chy-lus<sup>1</sup> who gives a vivid and accurate account of the struggle. In this poem he represents the speaker as a Persian:—

First their [the Greek] right wing moved in order meet;  
 Next the whole line its forward course began,  
 And all at once we heard a mighty shout, —  
 “ O sons of Hellenes, forward, free your country;  
 Free too your wives, your children, and the shrines  
 Built to your fathers' Gods, and holy tombs  
 Your ancestors now rest in. Now the fight  
 Is for our all!” And on our side indeed  
 Arose in answer din of Persian speech,  
 And time to wait was over: ship on ship  
 Dashed its bronze-pointed beak; and first a barque  
 Of Hellas did the encounter fierce begin,  
 And from Phoenician vessel crashes off  
 Her carved prow. And each against his neighbor  
 Steers his own ship: and first the mighty flood  
 Of Persian host held out. But when the ships  
 Were crowded in the straits, nor could they give  
 Help to each other, they with their mutual shocks,  
 With beaks of bronze went crushing each the other,  
 Shivering their rowers' benches. And the ships  
 Of Hellas, with manoeuvring not unskilful,  
 Charged circling round them. And the hulls of ships  
 Floated capsized, nor could the sea be seen,  
 Filled, as it was, with wrecks and carcasses;  
 And all the shores and rocks were full of corpses,  
 And every ship was wildly rowed in fight,  
 All that composed the Persian armament.

<sup>1</sup> See § 240.

Xerxes, who viewed the battle from the brow of a hill near the shore, was disheartened by the overthrow of his fleet. He returned to Asia, leaving the greater part of his force with Mardonius. Although the fleet dared no longer face the Greeks, it still kept communications open between Asia Minor and the army.<sup>1</sup> Mardonius was therefore able during the following winter to maintain himself in Greece. The real crisis was yet to come.

206. **The Battles of Plataea and Mycale (479 B.C.).**—The invaders had destroyed Athens; so that when the Athenians returned



to their city they found it in ruins. Though they might during the winter have made good terms with the enemy, they remained loyal to Hellas, only urging that the Peloponnesian army should be displayed as soon as possible in Boeotia. In the spring of 479 B.C. Mardonius moved from his winter quarters in Thessaly into central Greece, and the Athenians again abandoned their city. Some of the Peloponnesians were at home; others were busy working on the Isthmian wall, behind which they still planned to make their defence. With urging and threats the Athenians finally induced the

<sup>1</sup> After the battle Themistocles advised the Greeks to sail instantly to the Hellespont, destroy the bridge, and thus cut the communication of Xerxes with his base of supplies. The move would have ended the war, but the other admirals considered it too bold.

ephors of Sparta to put forth their whole military strength in defence of central Greece. Pau-sa'ni-as, regent for the young son of Leonidas, brought to the Isthmus five thousand heavy-armed Spartans, as many heavy-armed perioeci, and forty thousand light-armed helots. There the allied troops from Peloponnese joined him, and at Eleusis he was further reënforced by eight thousand Athenians under Aristeides. Herodotus estimates the Persian army at three hundred thousand, the Greek at a little more than one hundred thousand.<sup>1</sup> Mardonius retired to Boeotia, and Pausanias followed him. The Persians encamped northeast of Pla-tae'a on a level spot which would give room for the movements of their cavalry. The Greek commander took a position on a height above them; but, encouraged by a successful skirmish with the Persian horsemen, he came down to the plain and placed himself between the enemy and Plataea. There the armies faced each other twelve days, neither daring to open battle. But after the Persian cavalry had damaged a spring on which the Greeks depended for water, Pausanias decided to retire in the night to a more favorable position near Plataea. Mardonius, who thought this movement a retreat, made haste to attack. When the Persians overtook the Greeks and saw them face about, they made a barricade of their long shields by fastening the lower ends in the ground, and from behind this defence they poured their destructive arrows upon the Greeks. The critical moment had come; Pausanias gave the word, and his men rushed at full speed upon the foe. In the hand-to-hand fight here, as at Marathon, the athletic soldiers of Greece easily overcame the ill-armed, unskilful men of Asia.

In the summer of the same year, the Greek fleet was tempted across the Aegean by the Samians, who wished to revolt against Persia. About the time of the battle at Plataea, — Herodotus says on the same day, — the crews of the Greek vessels landed at Myc'a-le, and gained a victory over a greatly superior force of the Persians. The battle of Plataea freed continental Greece from fear of Persian conquest; that at Mycale pointed unmistakably to the liberation from Persian influence of the whole Aegean region east and north.

<sup>1</sup> Probably the forces were considerably smaller than he states.

## IV. THE WAR WITH CARTHAGE

**207. The Condition of Sicily.** — We shall now turn our attention to the war which the western Greeks were meanwhile waging with Carthage. First, however, it is necessary to glance at the condition of Sicily at the opening of the war. The colonies established there<sup>1</sup> had attained great wealth and prosperity. All had once been aristocratic in government, but had more recently fallen under the rule of tyrants. The ablest among them was Gelon, ruler of Syracuse, who made his city the largest and strongest in the island. All southeastern Sicily came under his authority. He increased his power still further by marrying the daughter of Theron, tyrant of Acragas. While the great cities of southern Sicily were thus uniting under the rule of a single family, a similar combination was taking place among the states of the north. Rhegium, Messene, and Himera were united by the intermarriage of their ruling families. Then came a conflict between the North and South. The tyrant of Himera<sup>2</sup> was driven from his city. Escaping to the Carthaginians, he begged them to restore him to his throne. In this way he played the part of a Hippias.

**208. The Battle of Himera** (480 B.C.). — The Phoenicians, who had founded Carthage, were originally an industrial and trading people, with little taste for war.<sup>3</sup> But to defend their commercial position in the western Mediterranean they had recently begun on a large scale to hire troops from foreign countries. With her great army of mercenaries Carthage now aimed to win back the lands she had been compelled to yield to the Greeks. About the time that Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont, and probably in agreement with him, Ham-il'car, king of Carthage, landing with his army in Sicily, advanced toward Him'e-ra. He was met and defeated near Himera by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, with the help of allies from southern Sicily. The story is told that all day long, as the battle raged, the prophet-king of Carthage stood apart from his host, offering victims to the gods, and that at last, to appease the angry

<sup>1</sup> § 126.

<sup>2</sup> This was Terillus, father-in-law of Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium and Messene.

<sup>3</sup> § 49.

powers who seemed to be siding with the foe, he threw himself a living sacrifice into the flame.

**209. Summary of the War.** — (1) After the conquest of Ionia, the Persians attempted to subdue Greece. (2) The first expedition was led by Mardonius through Thrace into Macedon. Its failure was owing to the wreck of the fleet and attacks upon his army by the natives. (3) The second expedition crossed the Aegean Sea, captured Eretria, and landed at Marathon. There the Persian army met defeat at the hands of the Athenians (490). The event encouraged the Greeks to hope for success in the war. While the Persians were preparing for another invasion, (4) the Athenians built a navy and (5) the Peloponnesian League was expanded into a union of all the loyal Greek states. (6) Xerxes in person led his great army in the third expedition. (7) It annihilated a Spartan force at Thermopylae (480), and destroyed Athens. (8) But the Persian fleet suffered an overwhelming defeat at Salamis; and in the following year (9) the Greeks defeated the Persians decisively at Plataea and at Mycale. (10) Meanwhile a Carthaginian army which invaded Sicily was overthrown at Himera (480).

**210. The Immediate Results and the Larger Significance of the Victory.** — (1) The victory at Himera led to a treaty between the western Greeks and Carthage, according to which both parties were to retain their former possessions. (2) Greece continued the war with Persia for some years, for the purpose of liberating those Hellenes who had been subject to Persia. (3) The victory, gained by individual effort and intelligence, created a stronger democratic spirit, which in the following years we find active in both East and West. (4) The war did much to unite the states of Hellas: Sparta remained for a time the political centre of the East<sup>1</sup> and Syracuse of the West. (5) Finally, the victorious Greeks, filled with energy and confidence by their unexpected success, now entered upon their great age in literature, art, and politics.

Persian domination, had it been possible, would certainly have checked the growth of Greek civilization in Europe, just as it did in Asia Minor. Europe might have become for centuries a part of Asia. It would be idle to speculate at length on what might have been; but certainly the victory saved Europe from even the possibility of such a misfortune. It left the continent free to advance along the lines marked out for it by Greek genius. From these considerations it is clear that the Greco-Persian war was one of the most important events in the world's history.

### Suggestive Questions

1. Beginning far back in the Persian career of conquest, trace the events which led to the conflict with Greece. 2. With what object was Hippias guiding the Persians in their invasion of Attica? Find the answer in the

<sup>1</sup> Till 461 B.C., when the leadership came to be divided between Athens and Sparta.

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