BOOK LII

The following is contained in the Fifty-second of Dio's Rome:

How Caesar planned to lay aside his sovereignty (chaps. 1-69).

How he began to be called emperor (chap. 42).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Caesar (V) and Sextus Auleius. (p. 29.)

Soon were the achievements of the Romans and such their sufferings under the kingship, under the republic, and under the dominion of a few, during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years. After this they reverted to what was, strictly speaking, a monarchy, although Caesar planned to lay down his arms and to entrust the management of the state to the senate and the people. He made his decision, however, in consultation with Agrippa and Mæcenas, to whom he was wont to communicate all his secret plans; and Agrippa, taking the lead, spoke as follows:

"Be not surprised, Caesar, if I shall try to turn your thoughts away from monarchy, even though I should derive many advantages from it, at least if it was you who held the position. For if it were to be profitable to you also, I should advocate it most earnestly; but since the privileges of a monarchy..."
are by no means the same for the rulers as for their
friends; but, on the contrary, jealousies and dangers
fall to the lot of the rulers while their friends reap,
without incurring either jealousies or dangers, all the
benefits they can wish for. I have thought it right,
in this question as in all others, to have regard, not
for my own interests, but for yours and the state's.

"Let us consider, now, at our leisure all the
characteristics of this system of government and then
shape our course in whichever direction our
reasoning may lead us. For surely no one will assert
that we are obliged to choose monarchy in any and
all circumstances, even if it be not profitable. If
we choose it, people will think that we have fallen
victims to our own good fortune and have been bereft
of our senses by our successes, or else that we have
been aiming at sovereignty all the while, making of
our appeals to your father and of our devotion to his
memory a mere pretext and using the people and
the senate as a cloak, with the purpose, not of freeing
these latter from those who plotted against them,
but of making them slaves to ourselves. And either
explanation involves censure for us. For who could
help being indignant when he finds that we have
said one thing and then discovers that we have
meant another? Would he not hate us much more
now than if we had at the outset laid bare our desires
and set out directly for the monarchy? To be sure,
men have come to believe that it somehow is an
attribute of human nature, however selfish that may
seem, to resort to deeds of violence; for every one
who exces in any respect thinks it right that he
should have more than his inferior, and if he meets
with any success, he ascribes his success to the force
of his own intelligence, whereas if he fails, he lays the blame for his failure upon the influence of the divine will. But, on the other hand, the man who, in following such a course, resorts to plotting and villainy, is, in the first place, held to be crafty and crooked, malicious, and depraved,—an opinion which I know you would not allow anyone to express or to entertain about you, even if you might rule the whole world by such practices; and, in the second place, if he succeeds, men think that the advantage he has gained is unjust, or if he fails, that his disconfort is merited. This being the case, men would reproach us quite as much if we should now, after the event, begin to covet that advantage, even though we harboured no such intention at the outset. For surely it is much worse for men to let circumstances get the better of them and not only to fail to hold themselves in cheek but to abuse the gifts of Fortune, than to wrong others in consequence of failure. For men who have failed are often compelled by their very misfortunes to commit wrongs even against their will in order to meet the demands of their own interests, whereas the others voluntarily abandon their self-control even when it is unprofitable to do so. And when men have no straightforwardness in their souls, and are incapable of moderation in dealing with the blessings bestowed upon them, how could one expect them to rule well or others or to conduct themselves properly in adversity? In the conviction, therefore, that we are guilty of neither of these shortcomings, and that we have no desire to act irrationally, but that we shall choose whatever course shall appear to us after deliberation to be best, let us proceed to make our decision.
accordingly. I shall speak quite frankly, for I could not, for my part, speak otherwise, and I know you too well to think that you like to listen to falsehood mingled with flattery.

"Equality before the law has an auspicious name and is most just in its workings. For in the case of men who are endowed with the same nature, are of the same race with one another, have been brought up under the same institutions, have been trained in laws that are alike, and yield in an equal degree the service of their bodies and of their minds to their country, is it not just that they should have an equal share in all other things also, and is it not best that they should secure no distinctions except as the result of excellence? For equality of birth demands equality of privilege, and if it attains this object, it is glad, but if it fails, it is displeased. And the human race everywhere, prang as it is from the gods and destined to return to the gods, gazes upward and is not content to be ruled forever by the same person, nor will it endure to share in the toils, the dangers, and the expenditures and yet be deprived of partnership in the better things. Or, if it is forced to submit to anything of the sort, it hates the power which has applied coercion, and if it obtains an opportunity, takes vengeance upon what it hates. All men, of course, claim the right to rule, and for this reason submit to being ruled in turn; they are unwilling to have others overreach them, and therefore are not obliged, on their part, to overreach others. They are pleased with the honours bestowed upon them by their equals, and approve of the penalties inflicted upon them by the laws. Now if they live under this kind of polity and regard the blessings and also the
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BOOK LII

opposite as belonging to all alike, they not only wish to harm to befall any one of the citizens, but devoutly hope that nothing but prosperity will fall to the lot of each and all. And if one of them possesses any excellence himself, he readily makes it known, practises it enthusiastically, and exhibits it most joyfully; or if he sees it in another, he readily brings it to the light, eagerly takes part in increasing it, and bestows the most splendid honours upon it. On the other hand, if any one shows himself base, everybody hates him, and if any one meets with misfortune, everybody pities him; for each person regards the loss and the disgrace that arise therefrom as shared by the whole state.

This is the charactar of democracies. Under tyrannies exactly the opposite conditions are found. But why go into all the details at length? The chief thing is that no one is willing to be thought to have any superior knowledge or possession, because the dominant power generally becomes wholly hostile to him on account of such superiority; on the contrary, everyone makes the tyrant’s character his own standard of life and pursues whatever objects he may hope to gain through him by overreaching others without personal risk. Consequently, the majority of the people are devoted only to their own interests and hate all their neighbours, regarding the others’ successes as their own losses and the others’ misfortunes as their own gains.

"Such being the state of the case, I do not see what motive could reasonably induce you to desire to become sole ruler. For that system, besides being difficult to apply to democrates, would be vastly more difficult still for you yourself to put into effect."
4 οὖς ἄρης ὅποις ἢ τοῖς πάλιν καὶ ταῖς πρόμαθαι
5 αὐτὴν ὑπηκοόν τινα παρέστησε καὶ χαλέπους μὲν
6 ἐκτείνα τὸν ἴθαμαν ἡμῖν, τοσοῦτος ἦς ἐπὶ
7 ἑλένθριον βεβαιώθην, καταλήψαι, χαλέπους δὲ καὶ
8 τοῖς συμμάχους τοὺς τὶς ἐπιστῆσεσ, τοὺς μὲν
9 αὐτὸ παλαιό δημοκρατημένοις τοὺς δὲ ἵθαμ
tὸν ἴθαμα καταλήψασι, ἐν δούλιαν αὐτὸν κατα-
10 στήσασι, τοσοῦτοι πέροις πολλοίς ἡμῖν προσ-
κειμένοις.
11 "Καὶ ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀπὸ πρώτου τοῦ δημοκρατήτου
12 ἀρκούσα, χρήσιμα σοι πολλά καὶ πανταχῶς
13 ἀναστάτως ἔσται περίζωμι ἁπάντων γὰρ τὰς
14 τῶν ἱδρυμάτων πρὸς τὰ πᾶλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν
15 τῶν στρατιωτῶν τροφήν ἐξαρέσατο, τοῦτο δὲ
16 ἔστω μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς δημοκρατίαις ὁ γὰρ οἶνος τὸ
17 πολεμέσι τινὰ ἄνω διαπίνῃ συστήσατο. ἄλλῳ δὲ
18 μὲν ἐστὶ δικαίως μάλιστα μὲν ἱδρύμα τοῦ πολλὰ
19 ἐπιδείκτητι, ἐν φυλοτείματα μέρος τὸ πρὸγαμ
20 παροιμέσι καὶ πιθανὸν ἄντι αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἀντε
λαμβάνεισιν· ἓν δὲ τοῦ καὶ ἀναστάτως παρὰ
21 πάσιν ἐσφοραὶ γίνονται, ἡμοῦτοι τὲ πέμπτοι
22 καὶ ὑπὲρ λαώτων συνελεύσεις ἀνέχονται. ἓν δὲ
23 δὴ τοῖς δυναστείαις τὸ τοὺς ἀρχοὺς πάντες μὲν ὡς
24 καὶ ὑποκλεύοντα ἔρχομαι ἔκπτωσις, τῶν μὲν
25 προσόντων αὐτῶν ἐτῶν ἔξευγον, τὰ δὲ
26 αὐστημάτως οὐκ ἄμως ἐκλογιζόμενοι καὶ οὕτω
27 ἱδρυμα ἢ καὶ λαῖες ἐπιδείκτητι τοῖς, ὅπως τὰς
1 οἱ Ρ. Μηλή, το ΗΛΙ.
voted of their own free choice. As for the voluntary
contributions, no citizen would feel free to make one,
any more than he would readily admit that he was
rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler that
he should, for immediately he would acquire a re-
putation for patriotism among the masses, become
corrupted, and incite a rebellion. On the other
hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon the masses,
the more so because they suffer the loss while the
others reap the gain. Now in democracies those
who contribute the money as a general rule also
serve in the army, so that in a way they get their
money back again; but in monarchical one set of
people usually engages in agriculture, manufacturing,
commerce, and politics,—and these are the classes
from which the state's receipts are chiefly derived,—
and a different set is under arms and draws pay.

"This single circumstance, then, which is as I have
described it, will cause you trouble. But here is
another. It is by all means essential that whoever
from time to time commits a crime should pay some
penalty. For the majority of men are not brought
to reason by admonition or by example, but it is
absolutely necessary to punish them by disfranchise-
ment, by exile, or by death; and such punishments
are often administered in an empire as large as this
is and in a population as great as ours, especially
during a change of government. Now if you
appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers,
you would vie with each other in acquitting the
accused, and particularly all whom you might be
thought to hate; for judges, you know, gain an
appearance of authority when they act in any way
contary to the wish of the ruler. And if an
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